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A study was designed to test the just world hypothesis in 
a situation where the derogation of an innocent victim was 
socially proscribed. In a 3 X 2 design, experimental subjects 
were asked to indicate their affect for an alleged victim of 
Nazi atrocities. In one condition, the victim supposedly re­
ceived severe maltreatment. In the two remaining conditions, 
the severity of the maltreatment was either moderate or low. 
It was predicted that, contrary to the just world hypothesis, 
increased severity of maltreatment of the innocent victim 
would not result in his increased derogation. Rather, it was pre­
dicted that the restoration of justice would be realized by the 
attribution of increased agency of the victim in his suffering and 
decreased attribution to him as a victim of circumstance, as 
the severity of the suffering increased. The results supported 
the predictions, though the increased attribution of agency 
and decreased attribution of victimization by circumstance 
were found only in the case of extreme severity of maltreat 
ment.
Lerner (1965, 1970) has proposed that individuals 
believe that the world is just; i.e., individuals see them­
selves and others as deserving the rewards and punish­
ments which accrue to their acts. There follows a 
tendency to attribute negative traits or deeds to a 
suffering victim and to attribute positive traits or 
deeds to a successful person. Furthermore, if a 
victim is obviously innocent of any misdeeds, this 
will threaten the notion of a just world. In order 
to restore his belief in a just world, the individual 
will, in such circumstances, downgrade, reject, or 
dislike the innocent victim.
A well-known experiment by Lerner and Simmons 
(1966) lends support to the phenomenon of the dero­
gation of an innocent victim. Subjects were instruct­
ed to watch a videotaped confederate who was sup­
posedly participating in a paired-associate learning 
task in which an electric shock stimulus was used. 
In one condition, the subjects could decide, mid­
point in the experiment, to reward the victim for 
her work and terminate the shocks. In a second 
condition, subjects were led to believe that, after 
the midpoint break, the study would go on and the 
victim would continue to be shocked. In both condi­
tions, subjects were asked to assess the victim’s 
attractiveness. The results supported the just world 
hypothesis. When subjects knew that they could 
reward the victim and terminate shock (thus restoring 
justice), they regarded the subject as more attractive 
than when they knew the victim would continue to 
be shocked.
Two further conditions in the Lerner and Simmons 
(1966) experiment suggest that the greater the appar­
ent innocence of a suffering victim, the greater the
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consequent derogation of that victim’s attractiveness. 
In one case, the victim was rated for attractiveness 
after the shock-motivated learning trials. In another, 
subjects were led to believe that the victim had agreed 
to withstand the shock in order for ether subjects 
(confederate victims) to receive credit for participa­
tion in the study. As predicted, the altruistic victim 
received lower attractiveness ratings than the victim 
who was at the endpoint of the experiment.
Several recent studies (Aderman & Berkowitz, 
1970; Brehm, Costanzo & Speck, 1972; Aderman, 
Brehm & Katz, 1974) have suggested that observa­
tional settings affect an observer’s reactions to an 
innocent victim. Thus, such variables as whether 
subjects are alone or in a group, or whether they 
are instructed to imagine themselves as the victim, 
are said to mediate observer’s reactions. Brehm et al. 
speculated that being in a group inhibits empathetic 
responses. And Aderman et al. found that in an 
«imagine self» condition, when subjects were told 
to imagine themselves as the victim, the victim was 
rated as more attractive than when the empathy- 
inducing instructions were missing.
Following the findings that a manipulation of 
empathy can affect the extent to which an innocent 
victim is derogated by an observer, the present 
study sought to investigate reactions to an innocent 
victim when derogation was inappropriate because 
of some socially-induced empathy. Specifically, it 
was predicted that the more severe maltreatment of 
an alleged victim of Nazi atrocities would not, 
along the predictions of the just world hypothesis, 
lead observers to derogate the victim all the more 
strongly. This prediction rests on an assumption 
that the social repugnance at Nazi atrocities in World 
War Π has created a setting in which empathy for 
the victims of those atrocities is socially induced 
and derogation is socially proscribed. One need 
not cite at any length the popular novels, movies, 
and theatre productions which deal at a deep emo­
tional level with the plight of Jews in Nazi Germany, 
evoking, as they do, genuine empathetic responses. 
Nor need one belabor the inappropriateness of 
anti-semitic sentiments in a social climate where 
such sentiments immediately evoke, with notable 
effectiveness, allusions to Hitler’s Reich.
The prediction that increased empathy would 
attenuate an observer’s derogation of an innocent 
victim does not in itself add to the research sur­
rounding the just world hypothesis. What previous 
studies have assumed, however, is that when em­
pathy is increased, empathy itself somehow mediates 
the derogation of an innocent victim. But this me­
diation is inevitably measured unidimensionally; 
i.e., it is established by the absence of negative affect 
for the innocent victim. What is ignored is the pos­
sible expression of derogation in attributional di­
mensions other than affect and attractiveness.
In the instance of victims of Nazi atrocities, one 
might well expect that an observer would hesitate 
to dislike the victim because of socially-induced 
empathetic responses. But what of the attribution of 
agency? Could not the observer, while avoiding direct 
derogation of the victim, still attribute negative traits 
to him by seeing him as an agent in his own suffer­
ing, rather than solely a victim of circumstance? 
This question of agency derives from the issue of 
the externality and internality of attributions and 
follows logically a distinction made by Jones and 
Davis (1965) between actors and observers in the 
attributional process. That is, if the just world hypoth­
esis prevails, as the severity of the maltreatment 
of a victim of Nazi atrocities increases, the empathy- 
inducing factor should decrease. And as that empa­
thetic identification with the victim decreases—as 
the victim becomes increasingly detached from the 
observer—, dispositional attributions to him in­
crease. In short, the observer perspective (in which 
situationality as a locus of control dominates) is 
attenuated as empathy is reduced and the victim 
is seen increasingly more as an agent in his own 
suffering.
The present study also predicts, then, that in a 
situation where derogation of an innocent victim 
is proscribed, the just world hypothesis will prevail 
in the attribution of increasingly more personal 
agency (dispositional attributions) than circumstantial 
agency (situational attributions) as the severity of 
the consequences of a predicament increases.
method
Subjects
A total of thirty-two female undergraduate students 
volunteered from two introductory psychology cour­
ses to participate in the study without payment. 
Subjects were usually run in groups of five. Two 
subjects were not used in the analysis because they 
were suspicious of the procedures.
Procedure
Subjects arrived at a large experimental room where 
the experimenter explained the purpose of the study. 
Subjects were told that, «the study you have volun­
teered to participate in is designed to see how inde­
pendent observers react to actual case histories 
from the Nuremberg Trials which followed the dis­
covery of Nazi atrocities in World War Π». They 
were then presented with a typed copy of the bogus
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case in a manila folder and asked to read it in detail 
and carefully.
Manipulation of severity of consequences. Each 
subject was given a case history of J. Z., a fictitious 
individual who was reportedly arrested by the Nazis 
in 1940. In every instance, the victim was described 
as
a Jew who, before the onset of the pogroms against Jewish 
citizens, was a baker in a small Northern German town. 
He did not, as far as the evidence shows, resist or take 
special notice of the rise of Nazism in his country. In 1940, 
much to his surprise, he was arrested and transferred to 
a relocation camp for Jews in Southern Germany.
The severity of the alleged victim’s maltreatment 
in the relocation camp was manipulated by supplying 
different endings to the foregoing account.
In the case of extreme severity (extreme condition), 
subjects were told that, «While in the relocation camp, 
J. Z. was cruelly tortured by the Nazis and died as 
a result of his maltreatment.» In the case of moderate 
severity (moderate condition), the case history con­
cluded with the statement that, «While in the relo­
cation camp, J. Z. was cruelly tortured by the Nazis, 
but was finally released when the Allied troops moved 
into Germany.» In the Low condition, no mistreat­
ment of the victim was cited: «J. Z. remained in the 
relocation camp, but was finally released when Allied 
troops moved into Germany.»
Dependent measures. Subjects were given five min­
utes to read and think about the case history. 
They were then asked to indicate how they felt about 
the victim on a bipolar adjectival, likert-type scale 
with endpoints marked «like» (+3) and «dislike» 
(—3). Subjects were then told that the 0 midpoint 
on the 7-point scale represented neither positive 
nor negative affect for the victim, but something 
in the nature of an «indecisive judgment» or «in­
sufficient information for judgment.» They were told 
that the intensity of their feelings vis-à-vis the end­
point adjectives could be indicated in a descending 
magnitude from the endpoint to the 0 midpoint.
Subjects were then given a second scale, identical 
to the first, except that the endpoints were marked 
«not responsible» and «responsible.» They were 
instructed to assess the extent to which the subject 
in the case history was «responsible for the fate 
which befell him; i.e., to what extent did he somehow 
deserve his fate?» In a third dependent measure, 
using the same scale with endpoints labeled «not a 
victim» and «a victim,» subjects were asked to judge 
the extent to which they thought the alleged captive 
was «simply a victim of circumstances—a victim of 
the situation.» In these latter two scales, as in the 
first, the 0 midpoint represented either an indecisive
judgment or inadequate information to render a* 
judgment of the locus of causality.
A final dependent measure was given to ascertain 
whether subjects differed in their attitudes towards 
the treatment of Jews by the Nazis, since such atti­
tudes might well affect the subjects’ attitudes to­
wards the alleged victim and the consequent deter­
mination of the victim’s personal agency in his 
suffering. On a scale identical to the foregoing scales, 
subjects were asked to rate the treatment of Jews 
by the Nazis as «inexcusable» or «excusable.»
results
A one-way analysis of variance of subjects’ ratings 
of the victim showed no significant differences (p (. 5) 
between the three communications. In the Extreme 
(X= 3.2), Moderate (X== 3.4), and Low (X = 3.6) 
conditions, subjects tended to rate the victim midway 
on the scale between positive and negative affect 
(«like» and «dislike» respectively).
Mean scores for situational and dispositional at­
tributions by the type of communication appear 
in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Mean Scores for Situational and Dispositional 




Moderate 6.30 a 1.60 b
Low 6.208 1.30 b
Note. N «■ 10 subjects per left-hand column cell, with measures 
repeated across attribution type. Higher means indicate greater situationali- 
ty or dispositionality of attributions, respectively. Cells not sharing a common 
subscript differ at the .05 level by Tukey’s ratio.
Scores were analyzed in a two-factor (3 x 2), repeated 
measures, split-plot analysis of variance for communi­
cation condition and attribution type, with measures 
for situationality and dispositionality repeated across 
the attribution factor. The summary analysis of 
variance (see Table 2) reveals a significant main 
effect for attribution type and a significant two-way 
interaction for the attribution and communication- 
factors.
TABLE 2. Summary of the Analysis of Variance of At­
tribution. Scores by Type of Communication
Source df MS F
Communication condition (A) 2 1.62 1.53
Error 27 1.05
Attribution type (B) 1 212.82 469.06
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An exact test of the predictions regarding the at­
tribution of agency to the victim was afforded by an 
internal analysis of the significant main effect and 
interaction. For this purpose Tukey’s q ratio for the 
a-posteriori comparison of means was used, with an 
estimate of q at the .05 level and a pooled error 
estimate by MS within cell. The results (see Table 1) 
indicate that in the Extreme condition subjects found 
the victim less a captive of circumstance and more 
responsible for his maltreatment than in the Moder­
ate and Low conditions. In these latter two conditions, 
there were no significant differences between the 
two types of attributions, with observers judging the 
victim very much a captive of circumstance and not 
at all responsible for his maltreatment.
A one-way analysis of variance of mean scores 
for subjects in the Extreme (X= 1.0), Moderate
(X= 1.3), and Low (X= 1.0) conditions on attitudes 
towards the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany re­
vealed no significant difference (p (.4) between the 
groups. Each group of subjects showed disapproval 
at the extreme end of the scale.
discussion
The data suggest that, when derogation of an in­
nocent victim is proscribed, extreme maltreatment 
will lead to an observer’s greater perception of the 
victim’s responsibility for that maltreatment. Those 
subjects who were led to believe that the victim was 
killed by his captors perceived the victim as more 
greatly responsible for his predicament and indicated 
indecisive reactions to his victimization by circum­
stance or situation. Subjects who believed that the 
victim was either tortured and released or simply 
released were equally convinced that he was not at 
all responsible for his predicament and decidedly 
the victim of circumstance.
It is clear, then, that the death of the victim was 
the decisive discriminating stimulus in making an 
attribution of personal agency to the victim. In both 
the Moderate and Low conditions, the victim was 
released from captivity, and the element of torture in 
the Moderate condition did not mediate the death- 
release dimension apparently employed by the sub­
jects in their assessments of the victim. Since, except 
for the death of the victim in the Extreme condition 
and the report of torture in the Moderate condition, 
subjects received the same information on the sub­
ject in all conditions, we must conclude that the
attribution of agency to the harshly maltreated victim 
supports the just world hypothesis. There is no 
reason to believe that an innocent victim who dies 
as the result of his maltreatment is personally re­
sponsible for his demise, unless it is to restore some 
belief in justice. The fact that an empathetic setting 
was socially created by the issue of Nazi atrocities 
—a creation supported in the failure to find direct 
derogation of victims in any condition—adds to 
the strength of this conclusion.
It should be noted that, owing to the nature of the 
case histories, it was deemed better to take a single 
measure of affect for the victim, rather than to 
measure affect (or attractiveness) indirectly by com­
posite scores on a series of bipolar adjectival scales, 
as in the Lerner and Simmons (1966) study. This 
was to reduce the subjects’ suspicion of the measure­
ment of a number of traits for a victim who, unlike 
the victim in the Lerner and Simmons study, 
was not physically present (at least via television 
monitors) to the subjects. As such, this measurement 
does not exactly replicate the dimension of affect 
tapped in that study. On the other hand, the measure­
ment of the attribution of agency, it seems to the 
authors, is the most direct measurement of the 
just world hypothesis: To what extent is an innocent 
victim responsible for his plight? Any attribution 
of responsibility under such circumstances offers 
unequivocal support for the just world hypothesis.
The use of causal dimensions as channels of nega­
tive attribution in this study has some far-reaching 
implications. Aderman et al. (1974) conclude that, 
rather than just world considerations, empathy- 
inhibiting instructions account for the strong dero­
gation of innocent victims in the Lerner and Simmons 
(1966) study. They also offer evidence that, in em­
pathy-inducing situations, victims are not derogated. 
The present results, however, offer evidence of dero­
gation by the attribution of personal responsibility 
in an empathy-inducing situation, while at the same 
time replicating the findings of Aderman et al. on 
the dimension of affect. Clearly dimensions other 
than affect can act as channels of derogation.
An interesting incidental aspect of the study con­
cerns the Brehm et al. (1972) speculation concerning 
the effects of group size and anonymity on the dero­
gation of victims. In the present study subjects were 
guaranteed anonymity and had no way of knowing 
that they were assessing the same victim as another 
subject in the group. Future studies might employ 
such a case history procedure as a control of these 
variables.
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